Environmental Degradation and
ISSUE NO.
2
May 1999
Environmental refugees are “...those
people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural
and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or
seriously affected the quality of their life”
El-Hinnawi, 1985
Introduction:
Linking Environment and Population Displacement
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
in the 1993 State of the World’s Refugees, identified four root
causes of refugee flows. These were political instability, economic
tensions, ethnic conflict, and environmental degradation.
The claim that environmental degradation was a root cause of refugee
flows was inspired by a number of articles suggesting a link between
environmental degradation and population movement, and a recognition
that the numbers of displaced persons internationally were much larger
than indicated by the statistics on refugee flows.
However, population displacement due to environmental
degradation is not a recent phenomenon. Historically, people have had
to leave their land because it had been degraded (through natural disasters,
war or over-exploitation) and could not sustain them. What is recent
is the potential for large movements of people resulting from a combination
of resource depletion, the irreversible destruction of the environment,
and population growth (among other factors). The physical environment
now is changing in ways that make human populations more vulnerable
to environmental stress. As deforestation, global warming and other
threats appear, a new category of displaced people is being discussed
— so-called “environmental refugees.”
According to some writers, the number of people displaced
by environmental degradation is immense. Jacobson (1988) notes that,
“environmental refugees have become the single largest class of displaced
persons in the world.” Because governments do not take official account
of this unconventional category, estimates of the number of environmental
refugees vary greatly. They start at 10 million persons; more than
half of whom are believed to be in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other estimates
put the numbers as high as 25 million (Myers, 1992). Westing (1992),
using UN data from 1990, documents the number of displaced persons throughout
the world. His calculation includes 16.7 million officially recognized
refugees, 3.5 million unrecognized, cross-border “refugees,” and 21.3
million unrecognized, internal “refugees.” He sums these into a category
of “total national refugees,” equaling 41.5 million persons. In 1986,
the total number of national refugees was 26.4 million people. Westing
speculates that the growth is due to the addition of “environmental
refugees.”
There are also claims that the numbers of environmental
refugees are expected to increase rapidly. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (1990) noted that the greatest effect of climate change
may be human migration: millions of people will be displaced due to
shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption. Following
this, Myers (1992) projects that in a greenhouse-affected world (in
the year 2050) the number of environmental refugees will be 150 million
persons.
Other authors claim that environmental degradation is
likely to produce “waves of environmental refugees that spill across
borders with destabilizing effects” on domestic order and international
relations (see Homer-Dixon, 1991). While environmental degradation
as a cause of refugee flows remains speculative, there is little question
that population movement can have significant negative impacts on the
natural environment. Recent refugee crises in Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia
have highlighted the devastating impact large-scale population displacement
can have on the environment and resources in neighboring countries of
refuge.
The discussion above indicates a dire human situation
and the possibility of a devastating environmental problem. Although
the estimates and projections of environmental refugees are based almost
entirely on anecdotal evidence and intuitive judgements, it is important
not to trivialize the role environmental change and resource depletion
may play in population movement. And while it seems that individuals,
families and communities all have a remarkable ability to adapt to changing
and distressed conditions,
it also seems that continued environmental degradation
and resource depletion, coupled with increasing impoverishment in certain
regions, places a heavy burden on these adaptation responses. Environmental
change may be a powerfully impelling factor in population displacement
in the future. Migration and environmental change impose harsh pressures
on individuals and communities, and have the potential to produce significant
economic and social disruptions. Despite these concerns, it remains
unclear in what ways environmental degradation influences a person’s
decision to migrate. Migration is a complex phenomenon, and it is difficult
to isolate environmental stresses from the web of social, economic,
and political relations.
How
many refugees and migrants are there?
This question is difficult to answer, due both to confusion
around definitions and as a result of the unreliability of data. The
International Organization of Migration estimated that there were over
80 million migrants in 1990. Fifteen million of these were refugees
and asylum seekers. By 1992, estimates put the total number of migrants
at over 100 million, of whom 20 million were refugees and asylum seekers.
Figure 1 provides UNHCR estimates of the number of refugees and internally
displaced persons. However, the UNHCR acknowledges that collecting
accurate statistical data on refugees and asylum-seekers is “one of
the most problematic issues” confronting the agency. Indeed, all numbers
relating to refugees/migrants cited in this document must be accepted
with caution because of these related problems of definition and
data reliability.
Nevertheless, rough estimates of the total number of
displaced persons are often presented with abandon, either to cause
alarm or for political reasons. Myers (1995) states that China has
“120 million internal migrants, and at least…six million deserve to
be regarded as environmental refugees.” He goes on to say that there
are at least 25 million “environmental refugees” in the world. The
International Organization for Migration goes farther, noting that by
the turn of the century there may be one billion persons who
have been “environmentally displaced from their original habitat.”
These inflated numbers and the problem of definition lead to confusion
over how environment and population displacement are linked, as noted
above. However, they also can be used to instill fear in people and
institutions who may be influenced by the vision of “waves of refugees
spilling over” their borders. This can be (and, indeed has been)
used by certain organizations in the North to promote racist policies
and lead to a “greening of hate.”
(Source: UNHCR 1995)
If deterioration of these natural
resource systems continues, political and social instability will be
exacerbated as will economic stagnation and rural poverty. This phenomenon
in turn will constrain future economic and social development in all
seven countries of greater Central America.
Environmental degradation, therefore,
may have played a contributing role in the population movement in El
Salvador. It was not, however, a root cause.
Another frequently used example is the
Sahel, where droughts and famine have had severe impacts on people in
almost every country in the region. Poverty, marginal agricultural
land, institutional constraints, war, inflation and landlessness have
not only increased the vulnerability of the population to climate variation,
but have also affected the ability of individuals and communities to
adapt to a changing environment. The people became more vulnerable,
not because of environmental degradation, per se, but because of a host
of other social, economic and institutional factors.
What
are the Criticisms of the Environment/Migration Link?
The written work popularizing the phenomenon
of environmental refugees is problematic for reasons that are both definitional
and substantive. First, the words “estimate” and “speculate” used above
should be taken to heart: in most cases these numbers are little more
than educated guesswork and there is little empirical evidence with
which to authenticate these authors’ claims.
Second, there is an uncritical acceptance
of a direct cause and effect relationship between environmental degradation
and population displacement. Implicit in these writings is the assumption
that environmental degradation, as a possible cause of population displacement,
is separate from social, economic and political relations. Instead,
we argue that degradation of the environment is inextricably connected
to these factors. Therefore, in order to gain some understanding of
how the environment is a factor in population movement it is important
to understand the environment in its broader economic, political and
social context.
Third, as well as the ambiguous and inconsistent
definitions offered for environmental refugees and the failure to consider
human adaptations in the projections of numbers, there is no discussion
of the roles public policy and other factors play in the increasing
numbers of displaced people. Furthermore, in most cases the analyses
are superficial. That fact is that people continue to move into
Mexico City and Chongqing, China, two of the most polluted places on
Earth. Why is this? Why, in many cases, does severe environmental
degradation not generate large out migration? Homer Dixon’s
characterization that “waves of environmental refugees” will “spill
across borders with destabilizing effects” is simplistic and it assists
in building an isolationist mentality. Clearly, there needs to be more
thorough and detailed assessments of the links between environmental
degradation and population movement. These inquiries must include
the complex sets of economic, political and social issues, such as inequality,
institutional structure and economic globalization, in which the environment
is embedded.
Last, some authors are concerned there
is no legal basis for the definition of “environmental refugee.” El-Hinnawi’s
definition, presented at the beginning of this document, conflicts with
the standard definition that was codified in the 1951 UN Convention
and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. More important
is the anecdotal discussion of environmental refugees, which is muddling
the concerted attempts made by some people to incorporate broader human
rights criteria in the determination of refugee status (McGregor, 1993).
While there is a need to better understand
how environmental degradation and resource depletion may contribute
to population displacement, it should be clear that, at present, the
relationships are uncertain. Before “environment” can be considered
a major cause of refugee movements, there needs to be an improved understanding
of what is meant by “environmental degradation,” what role it may play
in population movement, and whether persons displaced due to environmental
factors are displaced permanently or temporarily. Until these issues
are clarified, anecdotal reporting may simply undermine the concerted
attempts to better accommodate the growing number
of displaced persons.
General
Conclusions
Generalizations about the relationship
between environmental degradation and population movement mask a great
deal of the complexity that characterizes migration decision-making.
Much of the literature suggests a deterministic
“cause and effect” model where a set of environmental stresses will
result in a similar response—migration—from individuals and communities.
This may occur with certain forms of environmental catastrophe, where
the only option is to move; however, in general, such a model is misleading.
Levels of internal differentiation within communities are typically
high, and thus people will have different levels of ability to cope
with environmental stresses. Furthermore, people’s “tolerance thresholds”
are highly variable. In some cases, they are surpassed readily (perhaps
by the more footloose members of a rural community), and in others they
are seen as insurmountable (for instance, by residents who have a strong
attachment to the home area and thus a built-in inertia). To help us
identify the depth and breadth of environmental degradation it is essential
that we strive for a fuller appreciation and greater understanding of
the complexity and diversity of human responses to the phenomenon.
This will enable us to contribute to policy planning in a more meaningful
and significant way.
It is extremely difficult to isolate
the specific contribution of environmental change in many forms of population
movement, especially those that are more “voluntary” in nature.
It may be relatively easy to identify
the parallel occurrence of environmental degradation and population
movement, but assuming a causal link can be misleading and dangerous.
In reality, movement takes place in response to a combination
of stimuli: environmental, economic, social and political (including
armed conflict). Thus, separating environmental processes from the
structures within which they are embedded is both difficult and a distortion
of reality.
There is an implicit assumption in
the literature that movement is an assured means of obtaining relief
from environmental pressures.
Despite the ancient Chinese proverb that
states “Of thirty ways to escape danger, running away is the best,”
it is not necessarily the case that movement always reduces environmental,
or other, stress. In reality, movement may lead to the substitution
of one set of stresses (environmental) for another (economic, social,
political and/or further environmental stresses).
An important question concerns the
future intentions of environmentally-displaced persons, not least with
regard to the duration of their sojourn. This question is often overlooked
where the central preoccupation is with identifying the volume of the
migratory movement.
Do migrants intend to return to their
home area, if that option is available, or remain in their new location?
The answer to this question will have a significant bearing upon the
actions and behavior in their place of refuge, but also is crucial to
the planning process. There are three important stages in the movement
process:
survival—using movement as a means of obtaining relief from environmental
stresses;
recovery—where movers are able to use their movement to recover
from the problem, and consolidate their position; and finally,
improvement—where a person is able to use movement as a means
of enhancing their position
and prospects, in which case a return to the place of origin may be
less likely to occur. The prospect of reaching any one of these stages
is, among other things, a function of the severity of the environmental
crisis and the opportunities which become available to the displacee
through movement.
These conclusions underscore the difficulty
in developing policy prescriptions for dealing with environmental degradation
and population movement. Migration is a complex phenomenon, and it
is not clear in what ways environmental degradation influences a person’s
decision to migrate. It is also difficult, if not impossible, to isolate
environmental stresses from the complex web of social, economic, and
political relations present in everyday living. And there is a dearth
of research focusing on the ways in which individual or collective human
perceptions and evaluations of actual and expected conditions of the
environment relate to insecurity and migration stress. Developing policies
in this context is a risky enterprise. However, accepting these difficulties,
two sets of recommendations are presented below. The first set outlines
general recommendations for assisting communities and regions under
environmental stress, particularly where that stress may contribute
to population movement. The second set provides more specific recommendations.
What
types of policy recommendations can one make?
Despite the complex nature of migration
flows and the ongoing debate about the role of environmental degradation
as a cause of, or contributor to, migration, there is little doubt that
we need to give greater consideration to environmental deterioration
and resource scarcity in our development assistance activities. This
implies a major emphasis on promoting sustainable development and its
ecological, economic and social manifestations. Further, this implies
ensuring human security. More specific recommendations include:
• Develop a system to help anticipate
migrations that may be triggered by environmental disruptions. This
could be in the form of an early warning system (such as the UN’s Humanitarian
Early Warning System) or simply a continual assessment of the vulnerability
of regions and communities to environmental stress.
• Focus efforts on identifying adaptation
mechanisms, and how these mechanisms may be reinforced in vulnerable
communities and regions;
• Develop case studies of the influences
of environmental degradation on migration, with specific consideration
paid to the development of procedures for assisting those people affected
by environmental disruptions;
• Develop better working relationships
among and between organizations devoted to human rights, environment,
population and migration;
• Involve migrants and refugees directly
in the development of programs to assist those affected
by environmental deterioration;
• Recognize the cumulative causality
of environmental degradation and population movement, and assist receiving
regions to ensure minimal environmental impacts of the migration flows;
• Provide development assistance to
countries most vulnerable to future environmental change; and
• Recognize that human rights and the
sustainability of the environment—indeed, human security and all its
components—should be the cornerstone of any assistance policies.
Can
we make more specific policy recommendations?
As noted above, environmental degradation
and resource depletion are only two of many factors that may contribute
to insecurity and, as a response, population movement. Other key factors
surely include the pressures from rapidly growing populations and the
inequitable distribution of income and/or resources. The following
quote from the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED,
1987) is telling:
…Poverty is a major cause and effect
of global environmental problems. It is therefore futile to attempt
to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that
encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international equality.
This implies that policy recommendations
focus on promoting sustainability in resource use, consider thoughtfully
the complexities that underlie population growth rates, and address
the inequitable distribution of income and access to resources between
and within countries. Such policies should also incorporate activities
that will assist in reducing both the biophysical and social vulnerabilities
of individuals and communities to environmental change. Examples include:
• An increase in support for women’s
reproductive health and rights. Following the outcome of the
UN Population Conference in Cairo in 1994, there must be support and
funding for a comprehensive perspective on women’s health and human
rights.
• There must be greater focus on agricultural
activities and the role of multi-nationals in aggravating the resource
inequities that exist in many countries. This should also include a
focus on reducing erosion and deforestation, and increasing the sustainability
of small farms in marginal areas.
• Greater effort should be made to
improve environmental awareness and knowledge at all levels. This includes
care for the environment and sustainable resource use.
• In this context, an adequate supply
of freshwater is crucial. It is also imperative that treated water
is recycled for agricultural uses. Inefficient use of water, water
loss in urban areas, and the lack of systems to use recycled water greatly
affect social welfare.
• There must be greater capacity building
in the administration of environmental programs. This ranges from increased
support for NGOs in the environmental field to the development of government
agencies that can participate in international environmental work.
The complex nature of environment-population
linkages makes it difficult to develop policy recommendations that
are as concrete as many would like. However, it is apparent that environmental
degradation and resource depletion, often filtered through contexts
of poverty and inequity, can contribute to population movement. In
turn, it is clear that some population movements—particularly large
scale, mass movements—have a negative impact on the natural environment
of receiving regions. In order to develop a more meaningful policy
agenda, it is imperative that further attention is given to the links
between environment, population and poverty, to which groups are most
vulnerable to environmental change, and to identifying regions where
human insecurity, environmental stress, and migration/refugee pressure
may overlap.
References
El-Hinnawi, Essam (1985). Environmental
Refugees. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme.
Jacobson, Jodi (1988). Environmental
Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability. Worldwatch Paper 86, Washington,
DC: Worldwatch Institute.
Leonard, H.J. (1989). Environment
and the Poor: Development Strategies for a Common Agenda. Washington,
DC: Overseas Development Council.
McGregor, JoAnn (1993). Refugees and
the environment. In: Richard Black and Vaughan Robinson, (Eds.),
Geography and Refugees. London: Belhaven Press.
Myers, Norman (1993). Environmental
refugees in a globally warmed world. Bioscience, 43 (11), 752-61.
Myers, Norman (1995). Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena. Washington, DC: Climate Institute.
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (1995). The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solutions.
Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED) (1987). Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Key
Readings
Lonergan, Steve (1998). Environmental
Degradation and Population Displacement. Global Environmental Change
and Human Security Project, Research Report #1, Victoria, BC: GECHS
Project, 75 pp.
Myers, Norman (1995). Environmental
Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena. Washington, DC:
Climate Institute.
Renner, Michael (1996). Fighting
for Survival. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) (various years). State of the World’s Refugees.
Geneva: UNHCR
Web
Sites of Interest
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees: http://www.unhcr.ch/
Resources on Refugees: http://www.carleton.ca/~cmckie/refugee.html
Steve Lonergan
and
Ashok Swain
Uppsala University, Sweden
Definitions
To “migrate” means to move from one’s
habitat. This movement ranges from free, or voluntary movement, to forced,
or involuntary movement. In many cases, people are “displaced” by forces
beyond their control, and hence the term “population displacement.”
At the extreme end of involuntary movement are displaced persons classified
as “official refugees.”
According to the 1951 UN Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (affirmed in the 1967 UN Protocol on Refugees),
a refugee is a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [their]
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear is unwilling, to avail
[themself] of the protection of that country.” It is important to note
that this “Convention” definition does not include displaced persons
within countries, nor does it cover those fleeing from economic deprivation,
war, human rights abuses, or environmental catastrophes. The determination
of whether a displaced person has official refugee status is a crucial
one in terms of obtaining international assistance; unfortunately, there
are several categories of displaced peoples whose plights are as real
as that officially defined refugees, yet they are overlooked by refugee
assistance organizations and ignored during public debate. This problem
of definition often forces the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)—the
only official international aid agency for refugees— to make a difficult
choice between a strict application of its mandate and its humanitarian
vocation. In recent years there has been pressure to expand the definition
of refugee to incorporate human rights criteria in the official definition.
Various types of environmental problems
can also contribute to population displacement. The definition of “environmental
refugee” found at the beginning of this document was an attempt by Essam
El-Hinnawi of UNEP to introduce environmental stress as a cause of human
refugee flows and thereby promote eligibility of such persons for international
assistance. Notwithstanding the good intentions of writers to expand
the official definition of refugees, the use of the term refugees in
both an “official” sense and a general sense muddles discussions about
population displacement. Terms such as “environmental refugees” may
actually undermine efforts to have the official definition of refugees
be more inclusive. It remains that, while many persons may be considered
“involuntarily displaced” as a result of environmental stress, the combination
of international law and Northern political objectives continues to
limit the number of persons that may be granted comprehensive assistance.
Part of the difficulty in determining
what role the environment plays as a cause of, or contributor to, population
movement is that authors interpret “environment” quite broadly, or keep
it ill-defined. El-Hinnawi (1985) for example, notes three categories
of “environmental refugees”:
• those temporarily displaced because
of an environmental stress such as an earthquake, or cyclone, and who
will likely return to their original habitat;
• those permanently displaced because
of permanent changes to their habitat, such as dams or lakes; and
• those who are permanently displaced
desiring an improved quality of life because their original habitat
can no longer provide for their basic needs.
The identification of these very different
groups of migrants confuses the discussion. In the first case, there
is a temporary movement from physical danger; the second category involves
development projects where individuals are forced to resettle within
a region (and there is a question how many “internal” refugees are generated
by these processes); and the third reflects a voluntary movement based
on the classical “push-pull” model of migration.
AVISO is a publication of the GECHS project.
GECHS
The Global Environmental Change and Human
Security (GECHS) project is a core project of the International Human
Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change (IHDP). The main goal
of the GECHS project is to advance interdisciplinary, international research
and policy efforts in the area of human security and environmental change.
The GECHS project promotes collaborative and participatory research, and
encourages new methodological approaches.
The GECHS project involves activities
including research projects, workshops, training activities, publications
and policy briefings.
Interested individuals should contact
the project office for further information.
GECHS International Project Office
P.O. Box 1700
Victoria, B.C.
Canada V8W 2Y2
phone: +01-250-472-4337
fax: +01-250-472-4830
email: info@gechs.org
Website:
http://www.gechs.org
Opinions expressed here are solely
those of the authors and do not reflect an official position of the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the University of Michigan, the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars or the Canadian International
Development Agency/Agence canadienne de développment international.
prepared for the
Global
Environmental Change and
by
Steve Lonergan
University of Victoria, Canada
and
Ashok Swain
UppsalaUniversity,
Sweden
Advisory Board for Aviso
Steve Lonergan - Chair
University of Victoria
Geoffrey D. Dabelko
Woodrow Wilson Center
Gretchen de Boer
CIDA
Joanne Grossi
USAID
Mike Brklacich
Carleton University
Richard Matthew
University of California, Irvine
This publication series is supported by:
U.S.
Agency for International Development,
Office of Population
through a cooperative agreement with the University
of Michigan Population Fellows Program
- and -
Support by the University
of Victoria is gratefully acknowledged
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